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Abstract
Mass media consumption has increasingly been found to adversely impact upon psy-
chological states but research has largely neglected the potential influence of media on
aspirations. An experiment demonstrates aspirational incomes to be dramatically altered
by a textual narrative despite it not presenting any new information. The narrative is
constructed to elicit peer comparison effects, a common element of a variety of media
formats. The effect of the narrative rapidly dissipates when concentration is redirected to
unrelated tasks however, suggesting any influence media presentations have on aspirations
may only be fleeting. Nevertheless the results suggest that mass media might currently
be augmenting aspirations with potential implications for satisfaction levels, educational
attainment and risk preferences. Also the results imply preferences can be altered without
new information being presented, a violation of individual decision making theory. An
amendment to the theory is proposed.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Life in the modern age requires one to navigate around an inundation of commercial,
political and news media. Accompanying this is an increasing awareness of a range of
possible adverse consequences associated with media exposure. For example psychology
studies have shown television viewing potentially distorts perceptions of relative aﬄuence
in one’s society as well as cultivating materialism and thereby reduces life satisfaction
(Yang and Oliver, 2010; Buijzen and Valkenburg, 2003; Shrum, Burroughs, and Rind-
fleisch, 2005; Burroughs and Rindfleisch, 2002). Although the body of research analysing
the link between exposure to mass media and underlying psychological states grows there
has to date been scant investigation of media’s influence on aspirations.
This study analyses whether aspirations and preferences over various goals can be aug-
mented by seemingly unrelated media presentations. It seeks to offer insight on whether
reading a newspaper article regarding challenges facing a devastated Haiti may dimin-
ish one’s income aspirations or whether seeing the home of a fictional television family
boasting a multitude of modern gadgets would increase them. No prior studies have been
uncovered investigating whether aspirations can be augmented by exposure to such media
items.
Aspirations are of interest as they are likely to serve as mediating factors between per-
ceptions and values, such as peer comparison and materialism, with feelings of satisfaction
and motivation (McBride, 2010; Mentzakis and Moro, 2008; Shields, Wheatley Price, and
Wooden, 2009; Stutzer, 2004). This results in aspirations having a tremendously broad
range of influence with their being shown to play a pivotal role in influencing subjective
well-being (SWB), job satisfaction, attainment of tertiary education, willingness to accept
risk, motivation to overcome poverty and desire for empowerment and autonomy (Clark,
1996; Karlsson, Dellgran, Kilingander, and Garling, 2004; Kiyama, 2010; Leung, Chen,
and Lam, 2010; Poggi, 2010; Ray, 2006; van Kempen, 2009).
More generally any evidence demonstrating aspirations are susceptible to seemingly
innocuous messages would demand a reconsideration of individual decision making models
by revealing preferences to be susceptible to change without new information. Further-
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more these messages need not possess a direct relationship with the goals being augmented.
An advertisement for a holiday to Europe for example may not present any information
the viewer is not already aware of but may induce the viewer to more strongly prefer high
income at the expense of other desires. This could result in the viewer aspiring to higher
income without the original advertisement explicitly mentioning costs. Also the effect
may act on one’s subconscious with one being oblivious of the advertisement having any
effect.
As a first step in analysing the influence of media on aspirations this experiment primes
participants with a textual story to determine whether a simple narrative alone is capable
of manipulating aspirations. The narrative is considered too transparent and simple to
be comparable to typical media messages but embodies the fundamental element defining
all media items, the communication of a story. Should the narrative prove effective in
augmenting aspirations it would strongly suggest actual media items are imparting at
least as significant an influence on aspirations.
The narrative is designed to augment one’s peer comparison reference point by dis-
cretely drawing attention to either an aﬄuent district of Sydney Australia or a less aﬄu-
ent district. The districts used in the priming, Sydney’s Eastern and Western Suburbs,
are for Sydney residents synonymous with extraordinary wealth and the working class
respectively. This is confirmed by 96% of domestic students and 81% of international stu-
dents participating in the experiment identifying the average cost of living in the Eastern
Suburbs as being strictly greater than the Western Suburbs. The priming thus evokes
pre-existing considerations of aﬄuence and class rather than explicitly setting a reference
level. Although prior studies explicitly setting a reference point have successfully aug-
mented aspirations (Festinger, 1942; Sokolowska, 2006), they are unable to extend their
inferences to mass media presentations.
While this study considers aspirations in the sense of goals individuals set for them-
selves which includes but is not restricted to consumption, occupation and education di-
mensions, the constraints of a laboratory experiment require the operational definition to
be far more narrow. Aspiration is operationally defined as the ratio between the minimum
income considered necessary for a “reasonably comfortable standard of living” and what
6
1 INTRODUCTION
is perceived to be the average income of Sydney residents. Aspiration is operationally
defined by income considerations as they are likely to be reliable proxies for determining
the level of a variety of goals. It is expected that educational, occupational and consump-
tion considerations are captured by this measure. Also a minimum aspirational income
is simplistic enough the results are unlikely to be plagued by participants misinterpreting
what is asked.
This study also examines the persistence of any priming influence beyond the point of
exposure. The persistence of any effect is of great interest as the indirect consequences of
viewing media items may be somewhat mitigated if any change in aspirations as a result
is only fleeting. A risk task similar to that introduced in Eckel and Grossman (2008) and
a real effort task similar to one utilised in Segal (2008) and Cason, Gangadharan, and
Nikiforakis (2011) are used to distract participants after exposure to the priming mecha-
nism in some of the treatments. The risk and real effort tasks demand participants’ full
attention but otherwise do not involve any strategy considerations or intellectual exertion.
These tasks are introduced prior to the aspiration measure in some treatment groups while
in others the aspiration measure is obtained immediately following the priming. Thus the
experiment boasts a two by two design along the dimensions of whether a higher aspira-
tion or low aspiration reference point is established and whether aspiration is measured
immediately following the priming or after one’s attention is diverted.
Aspirations are found to be greatly augmented by the priming device but with the
influence rapidly diminishing if attention is diverted to consideration of the risk and real
effort tasks prior to the aspiration measurement. It is not observable whether the priming
became ineffectual in the treatment groups with a delay in measuring aspiration due to a
time delay, having one’s attention diverted or because the tasks exerted their own influence
on reference points.
The responses to the risk task reinforced the ephemeral nature of the stimulus with the
risk preferences being influenced only if measured immediately following the priming. This
result was surprising for it being in the opposite direction than anticipated. Participants
primed with higher aspirations demonstrated a greater aversion to risk than those primed
with lower aspirations, directly contrary to prior studies (March, 1988; Sokolowska, 2006).
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Diecidue and van de Ven (2008) offers a model explaining the observations, suggesting one
receives an additional utility gain from attaining one’s aspiration level. Hence if aspirations
levels are low enough such that one can attain them even with the unfavourable outcome
in a risk choice, one is likely to prefer the riskiest option that still ensures the aspiration
level is reached. Thus there may be a U-shaped function for risk in relation to aspirations.
Contrary to expectations effort was not found to be related to aspirations. The cause
is uncertain with one possibility that the effort task offered too great an explicit incentive
inducing a majority of participants to achieve the maximal outcome. Alternatively it is
conceivable the priming influence had already dissipated when the real effort task was
presented as in all treatments the real effort task was preceded by the risk task. Finally it
may simply be that aspirations do not translate to one’s motivation to perform a contrived
matching task in a laboratory setting. Any subsequent studies examining the effect of
effort should offer a lower compensation scheme for effort contribution or ensure the task
is more challenging. Also the order of the risk and real effort tasks should be reversed
between treatments.
The results obtained overturn conventional individual decision making theory (IDMT).
An additional component termed focus is proposed to augment the choice rule and allow
IDMT to accommodate the finding that goal preferences may be changed by stimuli that
do not present new information.
The aim of this research is to offer a greater awareness of potential indirect conse-
quences of exposure to mass media. It is hoped this will encourage the creation of mes-
sages that induce a beneficial secondary effect or deter those that may inflict harm. There
is a wealth of potential for this with higher aspirations associated with higher academic
performance and likelihood of attaining tertiary education, higher wages and job prestige
as well as drive for self betterment (Kiyama, 2010; Leung, Chen, and Lam, 2010; Staff,
Harris, Sabates, and Briddell, 2010; Koo and Fishbach, 2010). Augmenting aspirations
may also reduce risk taking behaviour through establishing realistic expectations or min-
imising hedonic adaptation (the tendency for updating of goals to erode gains in SWB)
(March, 1988; Matthey, 2008; Easterlin, McVey, Switek, Sawangfa, and Zweig, 2010; Gra-
ham and Oswald, 2010; Lucas, 2007). Also it is hoped exposing further limitations of
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traditional IDMT will encourage development of new theories that are more robust to
real world phenomena.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 synthesises the existing
literature relating to aspirations and suggests avenues for further inquiry. Section 3 details
the experimental design and procedure of this study. Sections 4 and 5 report the data
analysis and robustness tests. Sections 6 and 7 analyse the implications of the findings
and pose questions for further research including whether stimuli more closely resembling
real world media or stimuli based on facts have a more persistent effect. The majority of
the experiment instructions as well as data analysis results are reported in the Appendix.
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2 Literature Review
This study seeks to emulate media stimuli by exposing participants to a textual nar-
rative. Narratives are of interest as virtually all media presentations are focused upon
communicating a story. This includes news and finance reports that frequently attempt
to convey the implications of the report for individuals (retirees suffering with a slump in
equity markets for example). While no studies have been uncovered examining the influ-
ence of narratives on aspirations a broad range of studies have examined whether using a
narrative or case study is more persuasive than presenting statistical data (Dickson, 1982;
Winterbottom, Bekker, Conner, and Mooney, 2008; Baesler and Burgoon, 1994; Kisielius
and Sternthal, 1986).
An intriguing finding is that the vividness of the message (whether the information
is emotionally or conceptually engaging) is influential for both persuasiveness and also
persistence. Baesler and Burgoon (1994) for example found beliefs about juvenile delin-
quency remained altered by a vivid statistical message one week after the priming. It did
not find vivid or non-vivid narrative messages to have an enduring effect however. None
of the studies evaluating the efficacy of narratives considered aspirations or goal prefer-
ences although Winterbottom, Bekker, Conner, and Mooney (2008) did demonstrate that
preferences for health related treatments could be altered by narrative messages. Such
narratives are not comparable to those used in this study however as they sought to in-
form the viewer of the options available while the this study seeks to investigate whether
aspirations can be augmented by media not directly discussing aspirational goals.
IDMT accounts for a change in preferences upon receiving new information by suggest-
ing the information expanded the budget set to include previously unconsidered options or
simply changed the perceived utility of each option as the agent became better informed of
their attributes (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, Ch1)1. While a number of stud-
ies have proposed a range of choice rules to explain observed decision making behaviour
none have been discovered analysing whether stimuli devoid of new information be capa-
ble of augmenting preferences (Dawes, 1964; Zhang, Hsee, and Xiao, 2005). Any finding
that aspirations are susceptible to being manipulated by seemingly unrelated media items
1See Appendix A, p.52 for a summary of the notation.
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would offer some substantial insights regarding IDMT.
Relatively few studies have investigated influences on aspirations or their consequences
and the studies that do have not settled on a universally agreed approach. This presents
some challenges, the first of which being how aspiration is defined. Level of Aspiration
(LOA) theory provides some of the earliest consideration of aspirations in economic and
psychology literature. Festinger (1942) provided experimental evidence to support a model
of LOA that defines aspirations as the goal region one chooses to maximise positive valence
with respect to the probability of achieving the goal. This is offset by the probability
of failing and the consequent negative valence. Starbuck (1963) formalised LOA in an
economic context by integrating it with Expected Utility Theory (EUT). The study argued
EUT was neglecting the change in utility from achieving or falling short of a specific level
of aspiration and also that constraints of bounded rationality and limited information
results in individuals setting and gradually updating goals.
Studies focused on education and occupation aspirations more narrowly defined it to
relate to the relative academic performance one hopes for, whether one imagines one
will attend university or what level in one’s organisation’s hierarchy will be attained in
five years (Leung, Chen, and Lam, 2010; Duncan, Haller, and Portes, 1968; Gibson and
Lawrence, 2010). Koo and Fishbach (2010) meanwhile considered aspirations broadly as
the level of goals one sets for a variety of scenarios ranging from learning a language to
career progression.
Stutzer (2004) offered a material interpretation of aspirations by considering the dif-
ference between the minimum income one considers necessary for a reasonable quality
of life and one’s actual reported income. A modification of this definition is employed
in this study. A material interpretation using income considerations is most attractive
as it is anticipated to be a reasonable proxy for occupation, education and consumption
aspirations. Also it is anticipated one’s level of aspirational income would reflect per-
sonal characteristics such as ambitiousness and hence be correlated with a broad range of
personal goals. Karlsson, Dellgran, Kilingander, and Garling (2004) also used a material
measure of aspiration. Survey participants were queried about how necessary they felt
eighteen items of luxury consumption were including having a dishwasher and hosting a
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dinner party at least once a month. This measure is considered less attractive than the
income measure as it has the potential to miss categories important for the individual’s
aspiration if not explicitly asked and is considerably more complicated to interpret.
While the listed studies offer a sample of how aspirations are commonly considered in
research they do not offer an intrinsic justification for why aspiration levels would tend
to increase as one satisfies them (Graham and Oswald, 2010).
Evolutionary models of behaviour offer a persuasive explanation. Rayo and Becker
(2007) treated evolution as the principal in a principal-agent relationship with the indi-
vidual as the agent. The agent was considered to have an information advantage with
evolution being incapable of responding to environmental changes except in the longest
of time horizons. The model considered utility or more generally happiness as the mech-
anism by which the principle incentivised the agent. The updating of aspirations can in
this context be framed as the principle adjusting the reference point for success as the
agent became more informed. This reduces the risk of complacency and despondency and
thus maximises fitness.
The Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) complements this argument by offering a
mechanism by which the principle can augment preferences (Chaiken and Maheswaran,
1994; Ziegler and Diehl, 2003). HSM posits that information is processed by two dis-
tinguishable processing modes that may operate simultaneously. The Systematic mode
processes information in a focused way to determine the strength of the argument but
requires more effort than the Heuristic mode which relies on simple decision rules2. The
model suggests that complicated concepts may impose too great a burden to be processed
by the Systematic mode exclusively. Thus considerations regarding the optimal level of
aspirations may be determined in part by utilising heuristics of the observed level of
attainment of others in one’s peer comparison group.
Evolutionary models of behaviour and HSM provide the basis for the hypothesis that
aspirations would be susceptible to change through exposure to media items should they
be able to register peer comparison evaluations. Although there is evidence of peer com-
2These include for example Availability and Anchoring heuristics as discussed in Tversky and Kahneman
(1974)
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parison influencing aspirations, no research has been uncovered extending this to whether
peer comparisons can be influenced by media items.
The marketing literature offers some suggestion this is likely. Amaldoss and Jain
(2008) demonstrates a very powerful peer comparison effect consciously or subconsciously
influencing preferences by revealing the tendency for individuals to fall into leader-follower
categories in consumption behaviour. It reveals leaders wishing to distinguish themselves
from followers while followers wishing to emulate leaders. This study however did not
consider whether it was media items or direct observation of leaders that induced the
preference change in followers.
Where aspiration change is directly addressed there is commonly a perception of it
being predominantly a phenomenon guided by progression through the life-cycle or other
exogenous factors. Allenby, Garratt, and Rossi (2010) articulated this perspective but also
positioned advertising as a means to guide the process to change perceptions of quality
and thus form preferences for brands previously beyond one’s aspiration level. Although
the study directly examined the influence of media stimuli it did not suggest advertisement
may be a cause of aspirational change but rather a means of shaping preferences as they
naturally transition.
Little else regarding change in aspirations has been uncovered within marketing lit-
erature but this nevertheless exceeds the attention from management research. Of the
studies including a measure of aspiration many treat it as a reference point for the level
of return considered satisfactory when deciding between investment decisions (Brown and
Sim, 2009). Lant (1992) meanwhile considered aspirations in the context of future goals
an organisation is working towards or hoping to achieve and how these were informed
by previous experiences. Although this model could be expanded to a broader concep-
tualisation of aspirations it nevertheless did not incorporate peer comparison nor media
stimuli.
A review of sociology literature revealed a sizeable body of investigation in relation
to educational and occupational aspirations. Duncan, Haller, and Portes (1968) provided
empirical support for a model of educational and occupational aspirations of school aged
children being influenced by their friends’ aspirations. Although this study examined
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aspiration change from direct interaction rather than exposure to media stimuli it does
contribute to the hypothesis that should media items register peer comparison evaluations,
aspirations are also likely to be augmented. Other education and occupational aspiration
studies include examination of within family variation, variation across ethnicities and
between social class (Teachman and Paasch, 1998; Bohon, Johnson, and Gorman, 2006;
Reissman, 1953). None of these studies considered whether media exposure might augment
aspirations.
McDonald (2004, 2006) considered the potential for media to effect cultural change
and influence aspirations by discussing the likely impacts of television being introduced to
Bhutan in 1999. The studies are quite limited however, lacking empirical data they largely
offer intuitive arguments for likely impacts of television of the Bhutanese culture. Nev-
ertheless they do highlight Bhutan as a valuable destination for future field studies while
offering some reasoned arguments to suggest media may already be having a significant
impact on well-being in developed economies.
Of the studies uncovered Kacerguis and Adams (1979) offered the strongest suggestion
of media stimuli potentially influencing aspirations. It reviewed findings regarding the in-
fluence of media, toys and parental practices that constrain children in gender stereotypes
resulting in the limiting of occupational and educational aspirations of girls. As the focus
of the study was to review the various factors found to perpetuate a gender stereotype on
children and their potential consequences for career choice, the study provided no explicit
evidence of media inducing aspiration change. Hence this study can only serve as a guide
for formulating a hypothesis and motivating further investigation. No sociology research
has been identified more closely examining the topic of manipulating aspirations.
The psychology and behavioural economics literature provided some further evidence
suggesting aspirations are likely to change with peer comparison evaluations but still no
studies examining whether this could be triggered with media items were found. For exam-
ple Stutzer (2004) showed using interview responses that aspirations were more strongly
predicted by the proportion of wealthy households in one’s neighbourhood than by mean
income. Data did not include measures of what forms of media respondents were ex-
posed to and hence assumed the aspirations are formed from direct observation of signs
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of aﬄuence amongst one’s neighbours.
This is consistent with McBride (2010) which demonstrated with an experiment par-
ticipants compared themselves to others in the same category as themselves but to a lesser
extent with the wider pool of participants. The implications are readily generalisable to
individuals in society comparing their situation to only those in their peer group (such as
amongst neighbours, colleagues, others of one’s age group etc) and would not be expected
to compare themselves with anyone beyond those groups (other nationalities, opposite
gender etc). This study provides strong support for aspirations being influenced by peer
comparison effects. However the study induced peer comparison simply by informing
participants of the mean of others’ payouts. This does not consider whether real world
comparisons are informed by direct observation of peers or through media representations.
Hence the study cannot connect exposure to media and aspiration change.
A large body of the literature examining aspirations considers only the influence of
direct observation of those in one’s social group on aspirations (Gibson and Lawrence,
2010; Kiyama, 2010). Another body of research did not consider the means by which as-
pirations were updated at all. For example Karlsson, Dellgran, Kilingander, and Garling
(2004) considered aspirations to be dependent on a household’s economic situation and
a social comparison effect. The study did not state any assumptions regarding whether
households compare themselves through direct observation or media cues however. Le-
ung, Chen, and Lam (2010) similarly did not consider the manner of transmission for
educational aspiration change. The study measured self reported perceptions of the ex-
tent outcomes are determined by fate, whether applying oneself is appropriately rewarded
and confidence in one’s abilities and demonstrated a positive link between each of these
perceptions and aspirations. Leung, Chen, and Lam (2010) is intriguing for suggesting
an alternate means of manipulating aspirations without inducing peer comparison but is
beyond the scope of inquiry for this study.
While the bulk of the remaining aspiration literature does not investigate the underly-
ing cause, treating it instead as exogenous (Diecidue and van de Ven, 2008; van Kempen,
2009), a handful of studies directly manipulated aspirations. Sokolowska (2006) set an
explicit aspiration level in an experimental setting and revealed the aspiration levels had
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strong influences on risk tolerance. The results need to be considered with caution however
as the experiment was conducted without explicit incentives. Participants were told they
were a firm needing to choose between risky and safe approaches to production. They were
informed their firm would capture market dominance if they were able to reach a given
level of output. This level was changed between treatment groups and formed the basis of
the aspiration level. Participants with a higher aspirational target accepted riskier options
to reach this goal. A problem arises however of no explicit incentives being in place to
ensure some incentive for exceeding the aspiration level. With little intrinsic incentive to
choose a risky option that may allow one to exceed the aspirational level, it appears the
experiment all but forced the eventual outcome. The study provides compelling evidence
that aspirations can be manipulated in a laboratory setting but due to the overt and
contrived means of setting an aspiration level, this is not of great intellectual interest for
the purposes of the current study.
Koo and Fishbach (2010) offers the most appealing experimental demonstration of as-
pirations being augmented as the study conducted several experiments, including a field
experiment with workers of a South Korean advertising agency, using goal setting as the
indicator of aspiration. Goals are broad enough to capture the sense of occupational, ed-
ucational, material and general achievement aspirations, something not considered in any
single study otherwise identified. The experiments each involved priming one treatment
group to consider what they have already achieved and another with considering what is
left to accomplish. Each of the experiments revealed that considering what is still to be
accomplished rather than what has been accomplished increased aspirations. This method
also reveals aspiration can be reliably influenced without peer comparison considerations.
Although this study demonstrated a reliable means of augmenting aspirations without
explicitly setting a reference point it still was unable to provide any indication whether
individuals would be susceptible to media items. It does however offer a potential avenue
of future research to investigate whether media items are able to induce reflection relating
to personal goals and consequently affect aspirations.
Marketing, management, sociology, psychology and economic literature have all touched
on aspirations along a few channels of inquiry but none appear to have posed the question
16
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of whether mass media is capable of changing aspirations and whether induced changes
in aspirations can have an enduring effect.
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Design
The experiment consists of six components: a priming item including a check of aware-
ness of aﬄuence reputations of the districts of Sydney, a risk task similar to that of Eckel
and Grossman (2008) albeit markedly simplified, an effort task similar to that of Segal
(2008), a measure of aspirations, life satisfaction measures and a questionnaire. There are
four treatment groups in a two by two design along dimensions of whether the participants
have been presented with a priming mechanism designed to elicit higher aspirations or
lower aspirations and whether the aspiration measure is obtained immediately following
the priming or after a delay of several minutes where attention is drawn to tasks that
require some consideration (see Table 1).
Table 1: Treatment Groups
Aspiration Measured Aspiration Measured
Before Risk & RE tasks After Risk & RE tasks
Eastern Priming High Immediate High Delay
Western Priming Low Immediate Low Delay
Figure 1 shows the arrangement of the elements. The ordering of each task takes into
consideration concerns of participants inadvertently having their focus drawn to issues
that may result in their providing different responses in later stages (Kahneman, Krueger,
Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone, 2006).
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Figure 1: Experiment Structure
Aspiration Measure
An aspirational income is obtained by asking participants to envision themselves in a
future scenario where they have completed their studies and are living on their own. The
question posed is as follows:
Suppose that you have finished your studies and have been working as a pro-
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fessional in the field of your choice for a few years. Also suppose that you are
living on your own in Sydney.
Please indicate what gross (before tax) annual salary you feel would be necessary
for you to maintain a reasonably comfortable standard of living.
Ignore inflation and answer in today’s dollar values.
This measure is used as opposed to directly asking one’s goal income level as doing
so may result in the aim of this study being sufficiently transparent that demand effects
would become a concern3. Long and complicated measures of aspirations such as that
utilised in Koo and Fishbach (2010) are avoided for this reason. An additional benefit of
the minimum income measure is its being comparable to the aspiration measure utilised
in Stutzer (2004). A minimum income for a future stage of life measure is considered a
reasonable proxy to income aspiration levels while being sufficiently opaque that demand
effects do not need to be considered.
The majority of participants of the study are undergraduate university students. Con-
sequently a substantial variation in what participants believe to be the costs of inde-
pendent living in one’s post study phase of life is anticipated. To account for this the
participants are also asked:
What do you think is the current average gross salary for Sydney residents?
The focal aspiration measure is the ratio of the aspirational income to the average
salary estimate.
Figure 1 indicates where in the experiment the aspiration measures are placed. The
average salary estimate for all treatment groups is placed after the risk and effort task to
ensure perceptions of average salaries do not influence one’s willingness to accept risk or
effort contribution decisions.
Priming Mechanism
The priming mechanism is intended to subtly remind participants of commonly held
perceptions regarding the aﬄuence of either a relatively wealthy district of Sydney or one
3As truthful reporting of aspirational incomes cannot be incentivised with monetary payments demand effects
would not be preventable.
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considered to be less aﬄuent than the average. The Eastern Suburbs is selected as the
high aspiration prime as it is widely regarded as an upper class district while the Western
Suburbs is selected as the low aspirations prime as it is perceived broadly as a working class
district. As the priming only makes salient the perceptions already held by participants,
it is necessary to check that the participants indeed are familiar with the reputations of
each of the districts of Sydney. Thus the first stage of the priming mechanism asks the
participants to rate on a five point scale how costly it is in general to live in each of
the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western Suburbs of Sydney (see Figure 2). Only
responses from participants who rate living in the Eastern Suburbs to be more costly
than the Western Suburbs (the two districts to be used in the following stage of priming)
are accepted as the priming mechanism would be ineffective for anyone not holding this
perception. As the relative aﬄuence of each of the districts of Sydney is largely undisputed
and common knowledge to virtually all Sydney residents, it is considered reasonable to
elicit social comparison sentiments by referring to costliness of living in each of the Eastern
and Western Suburbs.
Figure 2: District Aﬄuence Check
The first stage directly requiring participants to associate preconceived beliefs of af-
fluence and districts also serves to make these concerns salient for the second stage of the
priming that involves a short fictional narrative being presented. The narrative is in text
form and is of a professional in her early thirties describing how she is fairly satisfied with
her life (see Appendix B, p. 52). For the High Aspiration treatment groups the priming
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states the subject of the narrative has lived in the Eastern Suburbs (generally considered
to be highly aﬄuent) for several years while the Low Aspiration treatment groups are
informed she has lived in the Western Suburbs for several years. The remaining content
of the narrative is identical. Although attempting to reflect a plausible account of an
individual’s perceptions of their lifestyle participants should nonetheless find it apparent
that it is contrived. All participants are also informed the narrative is ’stylised’ prior to
viewing the item. To ensure the participants read the narrative the program executing
the experiment remained on the narrative stage for one minute, more than twice the time
necessary for a native English speaker to read the material.
To address the research interest of this study it is critical to verify that the priming
mechanism both changes the aspiration measure through a genuine change in aspirations
rather than an alternate reason and is a realistic representation of the narrative commonly
underlying everyday media items. These criteria are likely to be satisfied as care is taken
to ensure the priming mechanism does not include any explicit suggestions of wealth or
aﬄuence. No numbers were shown in the priming (with the exception of the stage count-
down timer) and the priming narrative for all treatment groups included no comments
regarding material or consumption considerations. It is highly likely any change observed
in the aspirational to average income ratio is due to a genuine change in aspirations along
a material dimension. Also the exploitation of pre-existing notions of aﬄuence in the
priming is considered highly typical of many forms of advertising, especially luxury and
fashion goods.
Another core requirement of the priming mechanism that it not convey any new infor-
mation is satisfied by the participants not shown any factual statements. Their thoughts
regarding costliness of living in each of the listed districts are garnered but without feed-
back being provided while the narrative was described as being stylised. The notion of
a fictional character being satisfied with various qualities of her life in either an aﬄuent
or working class district would not overturn any pre-existing notions nor say anything
unexpected.
22
3 METHOD
Risk and Effort Tasks
The risk task is a simplification of that used in Eckel and Grossman (2008) with
participants presented with a panel asking them their preference between six options (see
Appendix B). The first option entails no risk while each following option has increasing
expected payouts but also increasing distribution of potential payments. Of the options
involving change the probabilities of each outcome is 50% to ensure participants are able
to clearly observe expected payout increases with each riskier option. All treatment groups
are presented with the same risk task.
In the effort task participants are asked to match words with numbers provided in
a key displayed in a panel above the questions (see Appendix B). This is very similar
in design to Segal (2008) although that study measured respondents’ time and accuracy
to complete the task while this study allows participants the option to skip the task at
any point. Participants will be offered a very large monetary incentive to match as many
words as possible in four minutes which is intended to be moderately restrictive. Effort
will be measured by the number of words correctly matched in the time provided. The
hefty monetary incentive for each correct response ($2 for a potential payout of $60) is to
ensure all participants will at least attempt to match a few words and avoid a clustering
of responses with no attempt made. As Segal (2008) found that performance in a coding
speed test of this nature is not strongly predicted by ability but rather motivation to
perform, any significant differences in performance between High Aspiration and Low As-
piration treatment groups is likely to be based on aspirations influencing one’s motivation
to perform.
Questionnaire, Satisfaction and Mood Measures
The questionnaire is presented following the average salary estimate and includes ques-
tions of parental education levels, region of birth and field of study (see Appendix B).
Satisfaction is measured at the beginning of the experiment to introduce it as a control
and to ensure that it is not compromised by any element within the experiment. The
satisfaction measure from one to ten is identical to question 22 of the World Values
Survey 2005-2006 and is measured. The question asks:
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All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these
days?
In the same panel a question asks participants to identify how positive is their mood
at the moment. The scale ranges from one to seven and is labelled from “Very Nega-
tive/Unhappy” to “Very Positive/Happy”. This is to ensure participants separate consid-
erations of their long run satisfaction from life considerations with how they are feeling
in that moment. Also the difference in scale of measurement somewhat inhibits the
participants from simply choosing the same rating for both without considering them
independently.
Mood is measured again at the conclusion of the experiment to check whether any
notable change in mood has arisen as a consequence of the priming or participating in the
experiment otherwise.
The mood at the conclusion of the experiment is also measured on a scale from one
to seven to ensure the result is clearly comparable to the initial mood measure.
Procedure
The sessions were conducted on computer terminals using zTree, a program designed
for carrying out economics experiments (Fischbacher, 2007).
Participants were invited through the University of Sydney’s online pool of registered
participants. The potential pool of participants are all recruited on campus and are pre-
dominantly undergraduate students at the University of Sydney. The majority are within
the Business faculty or Economics School but almost all fields of study are represented to
some extent.
As the experiment did not involve participants interacting with one another the ex-
periment was conducted on a revolving door basis throughout the day. Care was taken to
ensure participants who had completed the experiment did not communicate with those
not yet undertaking the experiment but as there is no strategy element to the paid com-
ponent of the experiment there would be little useful information participants would have
been able to pass on.
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The experiment was conducted over two days with participants informed that only
one in ten will be paid for their responses prior to accepting an invitation. Payment was
determined by a randomly determined number being matched to a unique identifying
code all participants were presented with when arriving at the lab. For details of how
payment was determined see Appendix C. Payment was made on a separate day once the
experiment was concluded.
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4 Results
222 observations were obtained. Of these 27 participants failed to identify higher
living costs in the Eastern Suburbs of Sydney as compared to the Western Suburbs. As
the priming mechanism requires that participants be aware of the relative aﬄuence of
these districts, these observations were discarded.
Only 4 participants indicated being born in Middle East/North Africa, 6 indicated
Europe and 8 indicated Americas. To reduce potential for spurious results due to small
sample size all such observations are grouped into ’Other’ in an adjusted birth region
variable. Similarly only 4 participants indicated their parent language as an Indian dialect
and 7 indicated a European language, hence these observations are grouped into ’Other’
in an adjusted parent language variable. 2 participants indicating their chosen major as
econometrics are grouped with economics in ’Econ/metrics’ category in adjusted field of
study variable. All following results are obtained using these adjusted control variables 4.
A summary of key dependent variables is shown in Table 2. The table reveals the
presence of outliers which is confirmed by plotting aspirational income against average
income estimates (see Figure 3).
The five extreme observations are accounted for by identifying them as such in an
“Outlier” dummy variable. A sixth observation is also identified as an Outlier as it
boasted an aspirational to average income ratio of 14 due to an average annual salary
estimate of only AU$2500. The resulting distribution of aspirational income to average
income estimates according to treatment group does not reveal any immediately apparent
differences between treatments (see Figure 7, p.61).
Dummy variables are created for each response of the categorical variables of parent
language, birth region and area of study.
Risk is coded to integer values between 0 (for the certain choice) and 5 (highest gamble
between $80 and $0). Similarly parental education is coded to integer values between 1
and 5 with responses of “unknown” recoded as missing. 8 observations were excluded
from some estimates due to unknown parental education attainment.
4Estimates using the unadjusted variables were also conducted but arrived at the same outcomes for the
treatment variables and thus not included.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
High Immediate
Aspirational Income 51 67088.24 20315.93 30000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 51 52362.75 13831.51 20000 95000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 51 1.305689 .3065522 .7142857 2.111111
Low Immediate
Aspirational Income 50 52320 15602.77 25000 100000
Average Salary Estimate 50 55100 16667.52 24000 110000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 50 .9794683 .2400336 .4285714 1.538462
High Delayed
Aspirational Income 49 100857.1 147889.2 5000 900000
Average Salary Estimate 49 52683.67 25435.52 2500 200000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 49 2.123284 2.712889 .025 14
Low Delayed
Aspirational Income 45 69533.33 72355.37 4000 500000
Average Salary Estimate 45 55755.56 76932.42 4000 550000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 45 1.3439043 .5219176 .3 2.857143
Dummy variables for whether the treatment was High or Low and also whether they
were Immediate or Delayed along with interaction terms are created5.
Estimating the effect of the priming without any control variables yields a significant
result along all dimensions (Table 3, column 1). Including all available control variables
the priming is found to have a statistically significant effect only for the treatment groups
where the aspirational income and average salary estimates were measured immediately
following the priming (excerpt shown in Table 3, column 2; complete estimate shown in
Table 10, p.58). This result is still observed when a more restrictive criteria for whether
the control variables are relevant is used and several control variables are dropped from
the estimation6 (Table 3, column 3).
The 27 discarded observations are checked to see whether the priming had a reverse ef-
fect on those who indicated the Western Suburbs as being more costly. Only 7 participants
indicated the Western Suburbs being strictly more costly on average than the Eastern.
There are too few observations in each treatment to ascertain whether the priming had
5See page 56 for description of variables
6Satisfaction, final mood, parental education, area of study, year of study and whether the participant
registered as an outlier retained
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Figure 3: Aspirational Income against Average Salary Estimate
the reverse effect for these participants. No results are reported for these observations.
The relative effect of priming on aspirational income ratio is shown in Table 11 (p.60).
This reveals the priming is still significant to the 1% confidence level for the immediate
treatment groups. However the relative estimation also indicates a significant change in
aspirations between the Low Immediate and Low Delayed treatment groups as well as the
outliers no longer being significant while gender now appears to be. No clear explanation
can be provided for these divergent results.
The effect of priming on risk is estimated using ordered probit regression. Table 4
column 1 estimates risk against the treatment dummies only and finds no statistically
significant difference across treatment groups. This is also suggested by Figure 8 (p.63)
showing histograms of risk preferences across treatment groups. When control variables
are included in the estimation however a significant difference is observed between the High
and Low Delayed treatments. Table 4 column 2 shows an excerpt of the risk estimated
against the treatment dummies as well as all available control variables (complete estimate
shown in Table 12, p.62).
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Table 3: Effect of Priming on Aspirational to Average Income Ratio
Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3)
Low to High Immediate 0.33*** 0.39*** 0.38***
(0.05) (0.12) (0.11)
Low to High Delayed 0.78** 0.53 0.43
(0.40) (0.35) (0.31)
High Immediate to Delayed 0.82** 0.32 0.24
(0.39) (0.22) (0.20)
Low Immediate to Delayed 0.36*** 0.18 0.19
(0.08) (0.20) (0.19)
Notes:
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Series (1) includes only treatment dummies as independent variables
Series (2) includes all control variables
Series (3) includes some control variables
Table 4: Effect of Priming on Risk
Regression Series
Risk (1) (2) (3)
Low to High Immediate 0.04 -0.1 0.06
(0.20) (0.22) (0.22)
Low to High Delayed -0.34 -0.59** -0.46*
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25)
High Immediate to Delayed -0.19 -0.32 -0.17
(0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
Low Immediate to Delayed 0.19 0.16 0.23
(0.22) (0.24) (0.23)
Notes:
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
Estimates obtained by ordered probit regression
Series (1) includes only treatment dummies as independent variables
Series (2) includes all control variables
Series (3) includes some control variables
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Table 5: Effect of Priming on Real Effort
Regression Series
Real Effort (1) (2) (3)
Low to High Immediate -0.02 0.63 0.30’
(1.40) (1.41) (1.39)
Low to High Delayed -1.51 0.76 0.07
(1.52) (1.53) (1.56)
High Immediate to Delayed -0.67 0.50 0.43
(1.42) (1.42) (1.46)
Low Immediate to Delayed 0.82 0.37 0.66
(1.50) (1.48) (1.43)
Notes:
Estimates obtained by tobit regression
Series (1) includes only treatment dummies as independent variables
Series (2) includes all control variables
Series (3) includes some control variables
The effect of priming on real effort is estimated using tobit regression due to a large
clustering of results at the maximum real effort outcome. Table 5 column 1 shows real
effort estimated against the dummy variables only while column 2 is an excerpt of the
estimate including all control variables (complete estimation shown in Table 13, p.64).
Priming is not found to have an effect on real effort in these estimates.
An ordered probit estimation is conducted with satisfaction against the control vari-
ables in addition to risk, real effort and aspirational income ratio. The treatment group
dummies were not included as satisfaction was measured prior to exposure to priming
and participants were allocated to treatment groups randomly. Table 14 (p.65) indicates
initial and final mood are related with satisfaction.
A histogram of satisfaction indicates responses are similar to prior studies with a mode
close to the upper range and a negative skew (see Figure 4).
Mood change is estimated using ordered probit estimation against the treatment dum-
mies and all control variables and not found to differ between treatments (see Table 6). It
is found to be influenced by one’s aspirational income ratio, one’s initial mood and one’s
parents’ language (see Table 15, p.66).
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Figure 4: Satisfaction Histogram
Table 6: Excerpt of Influences on Mood Change
Regression Series
Change in Mood (1) (2) (3)
Low to High Immediate 0.05 0.02 0.05
(0.23) (0.27) (0.26)
Low to High Delayed -0.22 -0.19 -0.17
(0.22) (0.26) (0.25)
High Immediate to Delayed -0.15 -0.05 -0.04
(0.21) (0.26) (0.24)
Low Immediate to Delayed -0.12 -0.16 -0.17
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
Notes:
Estimate by ordered probit
Series (1) includes only treatment dummies as independent variables
Series (2) includes all control variables
Series (3) includes some control variables
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5 Robustness Tests
As the experiment implemented a between subjects design it is perhaps also necessary
that participants in the High aspiration treatment groups consider the Eastern Suburbs
to be strictly above average in costliness and those in the Low aspirations groups consider
the Western Suburbs to be average or below average. The data is re-analysed by applying
a requirement that participants of the High aspiration treatments identify the average
costliness of living in the Eastern Suburbs as being 4 or 5 while those in the Low aspiration
treatments identify the costliness of the Western Suburbs being 3 or lower (recall the scale
has 5 points with 1 labelled “Well Below Average” and 5 labelled “Well Above Average”).
Table 16 p.68 shows some additional observations are discarded from the High aspiration
treatments but the data largely is unaltered. The analysis with this set of observations
provides the same findings as those already reported and are thus not included.
Squared terms for the control variables of risk, real effort, father and mother education
and year of study are included in estimates of the effect of the priming (excerpt of estimate
shown in Table 17, p.68). The squared and linear terms are not significant at the 5% level
and the conclusions regarding the priming and the other control variables are unchanged.
As inclusion of the squared terms do not meaningfully contribute to the interpretation
they are not included in the main analysis.
The estimate of satisfaction and mood change revealed the potential for multicollinear-
ity problems arising from initial and final mood and satisfaction being highly correlated.
A pairwise correlation matrix is obtained (see Table 18, p.70). This reveals potential
multicollinearity issues between area of birth and parental language, area of birth and
international student, mother’s education, father’s education and satisfaction and mood.
The variance inflation factor is obtained for each of the estimates of the effect of
priming on aspiration income ratio (Tables 20 and 21, p.69). As none of the VIF values
exceed 5 the estimates of priming influencing aspirations are not considered to suffer from
multicollinearity.
The priming is dependent on participants being aware of the Eastern Suburbs of Syd-
ney being more aﬄuent than the Western Suburbs however there is a potential for the
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results to be distorted should there have been a large enough proportion of the partici-
pants being ignorant of this but correctly guessing the Eastern Suburbs being more costly
on average. Domestic students are expected to overwhelmingly be aware of the wealth
divide in Sydney which is confirmed by the observation of 109 of 113 (96%) domestic
students indicating living costs in the Eastern Suburbs are strictly greater on average
compared to the Western Suburbs. Meanwhile 86 of 109 (81%) international students
indicated the Eastern Suburbs to be more costly. Although there is no indication of inter-
national students systematically guessing at the aﬄuence of each district it is worthwhile
examining whether the results are significantly different if only the sub-sample of domestic
students are used. The results are indicated in Table 22 (p.72). This reduces the number
of observations to 101 (some observations lost due to missing values for parental educa-
tion) and results in the Low to High Immediate treatments no longer being statistically
significant at the 5% confidence level if all control variables are included. However the
priming coefficient is statistically significant when the restrictive criteria for inclusion of
control variables is applied.
Table 7 reveals that the average aspiration ratio across the treatment groups for the
domestic student sub-sample is comparable to the averages for the entire sample. This
coupled with the reduction of the expected change in aspirational income ratio due to
the priming from 0.39 for the entire sample to 0.25 for the domestic student sub-sample
suggests the priming does affect the aspirations of domestic students but some differences
emerge regarding interaction with the control variables. It is not clear what these differ-
ences may be however as none of the control variables for the domestic student sub-sample
have changed sufficiently to become significant at the 5% confidence level. Outliers are
no longer significant but only represented six observations in the full sample analysis and
thus are unlikely to account for the extent of the change.
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Table 7: Mean of Aspirational Income Ratio (Domestic Students only)
Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
East Immediate 1.34 East Delayed 1.67
(0.32) (1.43)
West Immediate 0.99 West Delayed 1.37
(0.25) (0.42)
Standard Deviation in parentheses
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6 Discussion
An inspection of the summary results without outliers (Table 9, p.58) offers an indica-
tion of a significant influence of the priming on aspirational income ratio when aspirations
are measured immediately following the priming. Participants of the High Aspirations Im-
mediate group indicated a higher aspirational income ratio (M = 1.31, SD = 0.31) com-
pared to those of the Low Aspirations Immediate group (M = 0.98, SD = 0.24), t(99) =
5.96, p < 0.01. This result appears borne out of the priming changing perceptions of the
minimum income necessary for a reasonable quality of life ((M = 67088, SD = 20316)
for High Immediate and (M = 52320, SD = 15603) for Low Immediate, t(99) = 4.10,
p < 0.01) rather than a change in the mean income estimates ((M = 52363, SD = 13832)
for High Immediate and (M = 55100, SD = 16668) for Low Immediate, t(99) = −0.90,
p > 0.10).
The summary statistics also suggest the effect of the priming is diminished when
aspiration is measured following the risk and effort tasks. The High Delayed reported
only a slightly higher aspirational income ratio (M = 1.42, SD = 0.58) compared to Low
Delayed (M = 1.35, SD = 0.52), t(92) = 1.97, p < 0.10.
OLS estimates of the influences on aspiration including all measured control variables
and only a subset of control variables both reveal the priming to influence aspirations
if measured immediately following the priming (Table 10, p.58). With the exception of
outliers no other variable is significant in influencing aspirations. The magnitude of the
effect is noteworthy with a log-linear estimate revealing approximately a 30% decrease in
expected aspirational income ratio if the Eastern Suburbs priming is replaced with the
Western Suburbs priming (Table 11, p.60). These results need to be treated somewhat
cautiously as the result of the Low Delayed to Low Immediate treatment groups having a
statistically significant difference on aspirations disagrees with the linear-linear estimate.
If the relative estimate is considered more convincing it suggests the High priming did
not influence aspirations while those in the Low priming had their aspirations reduced
momentarily7. This would be consistent with Dickson (1982) finding greater weight being
7Perhaps a narrative describing someone living in an aﬄuent district being pleased with her life failed to
move people but the narrative of someone living in a working class district but quite content left a stronger
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placed on a negative narrative.
Table 10 (p. 58) reveals a larger influence of priming on aspirations for the Delayed
groups than the Immediate groups but with a far larger error. This is not reflected by
the summary statistics nor the log-linear model, both suggesting a smaller change in
aspirations between the Low Delayed and High Delayed groups relative to the Immediate
groups. As none of these are found to be significant at the 5% confidence level they
suggest the priming influence is largely lost after one completes a risk and real effort task.
It is unclear however whether the effect being dissipated is a result of a short period of
time having elapsed, one needing to focus attention on an unrelated matter or whether
the risk and real effort tasks introduced a new reference point (effectively functioning as
priming mechanisms themselves) and consequently diluted the effect of the priming.
The risk and real effort tasks are believed to have had a small priming effect, possibly
by making the potential for high monetary payouts salient, given the summary statistics
and Table 10 reveal higher aspirations if the risk and real effort tasks were performed prior
to aspirations being measured. If the risk and real effort tasks did not introduce a higher
reference point aspirations would be expected to converge towards a point bounded by
the levels of the Low Immediate and High Immediate groups.
The lack of a significant result on aspirations for the Delayed groups when estimating
with the log-linear model is consistent with the conclusion that the priming’s influence on
aspirations is greatly diminished following the risk and real effort tasks. The results of the
log-linear model still need to be regarded with caution however and cannot independently
demonstrate the priming effect does not persist after risk and real effort tasks.
The ephemeral nature of the priming is also supported by risk attitudes being influ-
enced by the priming only if one completed the risk choice immediately following viewing
the priming item (see Table 4 and Figure 8, p.63). The risk measure not being signifi-
cantly influenced by aspirational income ratio indicates one’s ex ante aspiration level did
not have an effect on risk preferences. This suggests ex ante aspiration is not applied
to the risk task performed in the context of a laboratory experiment but the change in
aspirations induced within the experiment did influence risk preferences.
impression
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Of significant interest is the result being in the opposite direction than anticipated.
Participants exposed to the higher aspiration priming had a stronger preference for less
risky choices. Some caution must be taken as ordered probit estimation is not significant at
the 5% level of confidence if using the more restrictive criteria for what control variables to
include in the estimation. Nevertheless the direction of the result is clear and contradicts
the model proposed by March (1988) and experimental evidence obtained in Sokolowska
(2006) which demonstrated those with a larger gap between their actual wealth and their
goal wealth would be more inclined to accept riskier choices.
A potential explanation is offered by Diecidue and van de Ven (2008) which augments
von Neumann and Morgenstern Expected Utility theory by incorporating an additional
utility gain derived from attaining one’s aspiration level. This results in participants being
more risk tolerant if the only options that offer a chance of achieving their aspiration
levels are more risky while they may be risk averse should the safer options assure them
of achieving their aspiration level. This is most clearly illustrated with an example.
Consider an experiment where participants are implicitly primed with an aspiration
level similar to the method of Sokolowska (2006). They are offered two gambles as shown
in Table 8 and asked to report which they prefer. Here gamble A is riskier with a greater
variation but also higher expected return. Assume an equal number of participants would
prefer each gamble if participants are first explicitly primed with an aspiration level of
$20. If however the aspiration level was $40, Diecidue and van de Ven (2008) and general
intuition would suggest a higher proportion of participants would choose gamble B. Hence
an increase in aspiration level from $20 to $40 would be expected to decrease the observed
risk tolerance. The same intuition and model would suggest however that an increase in
aspiration from $40 to $80 should induce more participants to prefer gamble A than
B given gamble A is the only option with any possibility of achieving the aspiration
level. Hence this demonstrates risk preferences may exhibit a U shape with respect to
aspirations, initially decreasing as aspirations increase from a very low starting point but
eventually increasing as aspirations continue to rise.
Recalling that participants were not primed with an explicit aspiration level in this
study it is impossible to translate the aspiration level reported by the aspirational income
37
6 DISCUSSION
Table 8: Hypothetical Gamble Choices
50% Chance 50% Chance
Gamble A $100 $20
Gamble B $60 $40
ratio into benchmarks for the risk task. Hence it is possible risk preferences were lower
for the High Delayed treatment relative to the Low Delayed due to the aspiration levels
being on the descending portion of a U shaped function but this cannot be verified with
the available data.
Effort is not found to be related to treatment group nor to the aspirational income
ratio (see Table 13, p.64). Instead risk and whether the participant was a domestic or
international student were significant predictors. This suggests that those who were more
driven to achieve the highest possible monetary payout contributed more effort but ability
was also a relevant factor with those perhaps less familiar with English struggling more
with the task. The observation that ability may be a relevant factor for some identifies
some restrictions to the claim of Segal (2008) that performance on such an encryption
task is dependent almost exclusively on motivation. However the observation that those
more risk tolerant did perform better supports the claim that motivation is a strong
predictor of effort contribution. Assuming this claim is upheld for this experiment the
lack of an observed priming effect suggests the priming was unable to stimulate or depress
motivation in the real effort task.
As the effort task followed the risk task in all treatment groups this may be a con-
sequence of too much time having elapsed between the priming and effort task, the loss
of focus with the risk task commanding all of one’s attention, the priming having no
influence on effort at any time or the reward to difficulty/unpleasantness ratio of the
task being too high. The potential reward offered of AU$2 for every correct response is
considered extremely generous to prevent data clustering should too many participants
choose to skip the task entirely. Unfortunately the reverse complication appears to have
arisen with approximately half the observations clustered at the maximum score. This
highly generous monetary reward for the task may have crowded out any intrinsic mo-
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tivation that might otherwise have been present, including any motivation from ex ante
aspiration levels (Pokorny, 2008). Should effort and aspirations be measured using such
an encryption task in future studies it would be advisable to reduce the monetary incen-
tive substantially, possibly not offer monetary reward at all, reduce the amount of time
available (from 4 minutes to 3 minutes) and to create another set of treatment groups
where the risk and real effort task order is reversed such that in at least one treatment
group the real effort task immediately follows the priming.
Satisfaction was not found to be significant with any of the measured control variables
with the exception of mood (see Table 14 p.65). Mood change is more intriguing with
the observation that the aspirational income ratio is a significant and negative predictor
of mood change (Table 15 p.66). Two sample t-tests reveal no significant effect of the
treatment group on mood change (High to Low Immediate: t(99) = 0.13, p > 0.10; High
to Low Delayed: t(92) = −1.00, p > 0.10). Given that the main result demonstrates
the priming to have a very significant effect on aspirations for the Immediate treatment
groups, these results indicate the effect of the priming has effectively dissipated by the
end of the experiment but one’s inherent aspiration level influences whether one leaves the
experiment with a more positive or negative mood. This may be due to those with higher
ex ante aspiration levels also having higher expectations prior to starting the experiment
and are thus more likely to be disappointed. Unexpectedly participants with parents that
spoke to them in a language other than English or a Chinese dialect would more likely
have a positive mood change. It is possible they had lower expectations prior to the
experiment but no intuitive justification for this argument is forthcoming.
Influences on Susceptibility to Priming
Characteristics captured by the control variables such as gender and risk preferences
may also be indicators of how susceptible one is to aspirations being augmented by media
stimuli. This is examined by including interaction variables for both treatment variables
and the control variable in question. This effectively results in a 2 × 2 × 2 estimation
with three individual variables of interest, three 2-way interaction terms and one 3-way
interaction term. The analysis of the influence of risk preference on susceptibility (Table
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23, p. 74) reveals no significant result at 5% confidence level for the low*risk nor the
high*risk terms. The lack of significance of the low*risk term indicates there is no expected
difference for someone more risk averse compared to someone less risk averse were he to be
in the Low Immediate group compared to the High Immediate group. Similarly high*risk
result suggests there is no expected difference in susceptibility for those in the Delayed
groups. An important observation is that the coefficient of the low variable in the left
panel is not significant at the 5% confidence level. This is a consequence of the variable
capturing the expected change in aspiration due to the priming for only those who chose
the certain gamble. There are only 9 observations in the High Immediate group and 12 in
the Low Immediate group that selected the certain gamble. This small sample size inflates
the standard error. Hence the finding of the priming no longer being significant in Table 23
can be safely discounted. The analysis of the influence of gender on susceptibility confirms
the priming is significant provided a reasonable number of observations are obtained in
each category (Table 24).
Gender, parental education and satisfaction are each similarly checked for any influ-
ence on susceptibility of having one’s aspirations augmented. Tables 24 to 27 reveal that
only mother education may have an effect on susceptibility. The results need to be treated
with some caution however as mother education only influences the priming in the De-
layed groups and the absolute coefficients on High and InteractionHI both exceed 2. The
signs on the coefficients imply that for participants whose mother did not complete high
school the priming persisted beyond the risk and effort tasks to significantly influence
aspirations. The effect is significantly diminished amongst those indicating higher mater-
nal education levels. Mother education not being an indicator of susceptibility amongst
the Immediate treatment groups implies that it influences the persistence of the priming
more than susceptibility to the priming. However there are only 4 observations in each
of High Delayed and Low Delayed indicating their mother did not complete secondary
education. This suggests a very substantial chance the result is an anomaly and would
not be reliably reproduced. Further investigation specifically focusing on the influence of
mother education is necessary to adequately identify whether it influences susceptibility
to or persistence of the priming.
40
6 DISCUSSION
Whether the magnitude of the perceived difference in aﬄuence between the Eastern
and Western Suburbs influences the strength of the priming is also checked and not found
to have a significant effect (see Table 28 p.76). The coefficient on the low variable is not
significant at the 5% confidence level also due to a small number of observations inflating
the standard error (18 participants in the Low Immediate indicated a East West aﬄuence
gap of 1 and 9 did so in the High Immediate).
Some Concerns
Although the robustness tests do not invalidate the conclusions initially reached there
are a number of issues that need to be addressed. Firstly the validity of the operational
definition of aspirations used can be contested due to the lack of an universally satisfactory
representation of aspirations. For the result obtained to be interpretable it is crucial the
income ratio reflects participants’ aspirations rather than some unidentified quality. When
considering the minimum income necessary to enjoy a particular standard of living one
would interact a reference point for typical incomes and one’s perception of the cost of
consuming a variety of goods and services. Thus the minimum income measure can be
augmented either by a change in one’s perceptions of the expense of a given basket of
goods and services or a change in the goods and services one aspires to consume. The
latter is considered a change in aspirations while the former is considered simply a change
in one’s perception of purchasing power.
Thus the income ratio may fail to reflect changes in aspirations if the perception of
purchasing power is somehow augmented. The priming mechanism exposed all partici-
pants to an identical narrative with the exception of “Eastern” or “Western” Suburbs. It
offered no information the participants were not already aware of. It did not highlight any
material aspects of living in Sydney nor any associated costs. Care was taken to ensure
participants were not primed with any numbers prior to the aspiration measure. It is thus
considered exceedingly unlikely participants had their perceptions of purchasing power
augmented. No explanation can thus be offered for the observed income ratio difference
between High and Low Immediate treatment groups other than the priming inducing a
change in aspirations.
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The priming and income ratio are exclusively concerned with material or consumption
aspirations. There needs to be some consideration for the possibility of other dimensions of
aspirations being crowded out. No literature has yet been identified to investigate possible
crowding out between material, family, relationship, educational and occupational aspira-
tions. Should material aspirations have been increased at the expense of other dimensions
this can have unexpected consequences for risk preferences, educational attainment, sat-
isfaction etc. Further research is necessary to investigate whether priming augmenting a
specific dimension of aspiration is effective in augmenting other dimensions and whether
the change in behaviour is dependent on the nature of aspirations being augmented. For
example it would be informative to investigate whether risk preferences are influenced in
the same manner by an increase in educational aspirations as they are by an increase in
material aspirations or whether a material priming mechanism can have an impact on
educational aspiration.
Also there is a concern that the experiment paying only one in ten participants may
have caused self selection amongst participants and under represent those who are risk
averse. As 23% of participants (45 of 195) who selected the certain gamble and risk
preferences were not found to influence susceptibility or persistence of the priming it is
not expected that the validity of the results are diminished by any self selection effect.
A further concern is the average salary estimate immediately following the absolute
aspirational income measure in the Delayed groups but following the risk and effort tasks
in the Immediate groups. This allows the risk and effort task to potentially augment
the average salary estimate and complicate comparison between the Immediate and De-
layed treatments. However there is no reason to suspect the risk and effort tasks would
bias estimates of average salary in opposite directions for the High Immediate and Low
Immediate groups. Thus there is no reason to diminish the validity of the finding that
aspirations are strongly influenced by this priming mechanism but without an effect per-
sisting after a risk and effort task. Any further research using this aspiration measure
would likely avoid such concerns if the aspirational income and average salary estimate
were asked simultaneously. For example participants may be asked their estimate of the
average salary and in the same stage then asked what percentage of this they considered
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the minimum necessary for a reasonable quality of life (with the clarification that they can
report more than 100%). This would provide a more explicit and transparent measure
of material aspirations but also risks an increased proportion of participants reporting
100% aspiration level while not reflecting their true position. An alternative is to obtain
the average salary estimate at the beginning of the experiment and to offer payment for
accurate estimates but this risks the estimate affecting the prime unintentionally. Some
pilot studies prior to any future research examining this dynamic are advisable to ensure
the aspiration measure does not suffer from these complications.
Implications for Individual Decision Making Theory
The manipulability of aspirations challenges the fundamental assumptions of IDMT by
allowing preferences to be changed without any new information being presented and more
surprisingly without the message directly relating to goals. The change in goal preferences
can be explained by existing IDMT framework if the priming can be considered to have
either expanded the budget set of goals one can aspire to or induced a change in the choice
rule being used.
A change in budget set is strictly ruled out as there is no reason to suggest participants
were not previously aware they would be able to aspire to a higher income goal. Also
the lack of any new information being communicated ensures the budget set must remain
unchanged.
A change in the choice rule being used is possible but cannot explain why the effect
does not persist. Also there is no clear reason why a high aspiration prime appears not
to change the choice rule while the low aspiration prime does.
Another possibility is that aspirations are obtained using a disjunctive choice rule and
the priming alters the reference level from which the search for a satisfactory option begins.
A disjunctive choice rule selects the first option considered that satisfies some minimum
criteria (Dawes, 1964; Zhang, Hsee, and Xiao, 2005). Butler and Loomes (2007) meanwhile
showed the initial reference point to be a strong influence on preferences. If the priming
changed the level from which goal incomes begin to be considered the observed change
in aspirations is explained within the current IDMT framework. However this approach
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is not quite satisfactory either as the ephemeral nature of the aspiration change requires
some memory element to be introduced.
The most parsimonious method of reconciling IDMT with the results is to incorporate
in the choice rule an element representing both a reference point and a memory dimension.
Refer to this as focus F . Hence the modified choice rule is of the form C(B,F ) ⊂ B8.
Thus focus operates by changing the weight one places on various qualities when making
a decision by altering the reference point. For example listening to a radio interview
with a relationship counsellor discussing divorce might temporarily establishing a starting
reference point of devoting oneself fully to one’s family and sacrificing one’s career. This
could induce individuals to weigh time with the family more heavily and income less so in
determining occupation goals as individuals tend to prefer options more closely resembling
the initial reference (Butler and Loomes, 2007). The effect will be lost after some period
of time or other matters of consideration crowd out the memory of the radio program
causing the focus to return to its former state.
The focus term can operate simultaneously with a changed budget set if new informa-
tion permanently expands the agent’s budget set from B to B′ (B ⊂ B′ and B,B′ ∈ B)
while also temporarily influencing F .
For example if an individual’s occupational goal is to be a teacher, C(B,F0) =
{teacher} with F0 representing her focus not being relevant for this decision. She then
views a television crime program and begins to consider forensic science as being equally
as attractive a career objective. She had not previously identified the possibility of work-
ing in this field, thus her budget set expands to B′ = {B, forensic scientist}. Her choice
rule would be C(B′, F1) = {teacher, forensic scientist} with F1 indicating she is being in-
fluenced by the television program. After a period of her attention being diverted to other
matters she is no longer consciously or subconsciously being influenced by the program
and her focus reverts to F0. Her budget set remains B
′. Thus if her preferences revert
to strictly preferring teaching over all other options her choice rule would be C(B′, F0) =
{teacher}.
8No specific choice rule is presupposed as the available data does not reveal any particular choice rule to be
operating.
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Stimuli can have different durations of influence which are likely dependent on how
vivid and memorable the agent finds the stimulus item. Thus an engrossing film may
have a significantly longer and more powerful influence than viewing a billboard on one’s
journey to work. However repetition may have a cumulative effect and result in the
billboard imparting greater influence overall. Further research is necessary to uncover the
impact if any of more vivid media or repeated exposure.
Although focus reflects a temporary effect it is possible focus may be unceasingly in-
fluencing preferences should individuals be constantly confronted with relevant stimuli.
Further research is necessary to ascertain whether this is the case and whether this in-
creases the likelihood of media messages leaking into a permanent influence on preferences.
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7 Conclusion
Aspirations and more generally preferences are shown to be susceptible to manipulation
by a simple textual narrative. This implies exposure to mass media may have indirect
consequences of which the viewers and producers of media may be unaware. The effect
of the narrative used in this study is found to be short lived but this does not dismiss
the potential for media to be perpetually influencing aspirations. This is due to the high
frequency of exposure to media as well as the potential for more vivid items to have a
more enduring effect.
Individuals wishing to maintain autonomy over their aspirations should limit their
exposure to any form of media that may induce peer comparisons. Examples include
news articles and celebrity magazines discussing the exploits of the highly aﬄuent and
charity adverts appealing for donations.
More research is necessary to identify whether there are cumulative effects to exposure
and also to ascertain whether more vivid stimuli (such as an engrossing film) can impart a
stronger or more enduring influence. Also there is scope to investigate whether narratives
communicating dimensions other than peer comparison, such as perceptions of fate control
and self efficacy, would similarly influence aspirations.
Risk preferences and aspirations are revealed to be more sophisticated than prior mod-
els suggest with individuals showing a greater risk aversion with increasing aspirations. A
U-shaped relation between risk and aspirations is hypothesised but this cannot be tested
with the existing data. Further investigation with explicit aspirational targets is necessary
to offer deeper insights regarding the relationship between risk and aspiration.
IDMT is shown to be inadequate, unable to account for the change in goal preferences
without new information being presented. An additional component of focus is incorpo-
rated in the choice rule to reflect the role of reference points and memory in determining
preferences. Further studies are required to evaluate whether the focus term is itself ro-
bust to real world observations or whether an alternate model for determining preferences
and choices is warranted.
A key limitation of the study is the aspiration measure relying upon an evaluation of
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what one considers to be the minimum income necessary to maintain a reasonable standard
of living. Although the measure is framed such that participants consider themselves in a
future stage of life no evidence can be offered demonstrating this necessarily is associated
with a proportional shift in aspirational incomes.
Another limitation of the aspiration measure is that although aspirational income is
expected to correlate with a range of other aspirations such as education, occupation and
social status, the current data cannot provide any indication of the effect of the priming
mechanism on these and other aspiration dimensions.
Finally there are external validity questions due to the laboratory environment of
the experiment. Hence the context under which participants viewed the narrative is
significantly divergent to the typical circumstances where one is exposed to media items.
Although participants were neither told reading the priming item was mandatory nor
that doing so would be rewarded the lack of any distractions or option to skip to the
next stage effectively forced participants to consciously absorb the material. This is not
comparable to a significant proportion of ordinary media exposure where individuals are
often actively attempting to avoid viewing the material (although with other material
such as news articles one consciously chooses to absorb the content). Hence this study is
unable to comment on whether media items that individuals are momentarily exposed to
but do not consciously absorb result in any observable aspiration change.
Several steps need to be undertaken in future studies to overcome these limitations.
Firstly concerns regarding the aspirations measure can be addressed by obtaining a more
inclusive aspiration measure. This includes directly measuring aspirational goals if de-
mand effects can be prevented and using priming that more closely resemble a range of
media items. Secondly the aspect of whether consciously absorbing a media item is re-
quired for aspirations to change can be examined by incorporating treatments where the
priming mechanism is subtly presented. For example in an explicit priming treatment
participants are asked to rate the effectiveness of a poster advertising a luxury car. In the
subtle priming treatment the same poster is displayed on the wall of the laboratory but
no mention is made of it in the course of the experiment. Finally future studies utilising
field data would overcome external validity concerns. Such data could include surveys
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of aspiration before and after major publicity campaigns (such as China advertising the
2010 World Expo) or a significant change in the media landscape (such as television being
introduced in Bhutan in 1999 or the increasing sophistication of mobile phones delivering
news, entertainment and advertisements).
This study provides the first step towards a deeper understanding of how media may
be influencing aspirations. In doing so it has raised significantly more questions than it
has been able to answer. It is hoped a greater awareness of how media may manipulate
aspirations will arise with further studies and in turn reduce harm and promote positive
behavioural change.
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Appendices
A Individual Decision Making Theory Framework
Define X as the set of all goals that one can aspire to. Define B ⊂ X to be a family of
all nonempty subsets of X such that every element of B is a set B ⊂ X. Call B ∈ B the
budget set. The choice rule C(·) assigns a nonempty set of chosen elements C(B) ⊂ B for
every budget set B ∈ B. The set C(B) may contain a single element if this is the preferred
goal for the individual among the alternatives in B but may contain multiple elements if
they are all acceptable goals. Assume that one of the acceptable goals is randomly chosen
to be reported should the agent be requested to indicate their most preferred option. Let
a high material aspiration be represented by the choice rule selecting a greater material
attainment goal.
B Experiment Design
Priming Item
The following is the narrative presented to High Aspiration treatment participants.
The Low Aspiration group had “Eastern Suburbs” replaced by “Western Suburbs”.
Samantha (not her real name) is a former graduate of the University of Sydney
having studied Economics. She has lived in the Eastern Suburbs for the past
eleven years. She has a mortgage and a daughter of primary school age.
I notice a sense of community here in the Eastern Suburbs with the neigh-
bours all being fairly friendly. There’s plenty to get out and do to keep the
kids entertained and there’s a few nice restaurants and cafes in walking dis-
tance.
We live near a big train hub so getting about isn’t too hard. That’s fairly
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important as my husband and I both work a little way from home but the
commute’s quite tolerable.
Another really important thing for me is decent schools. I’m quite happy
with the local primary school my daughter goes to. You just get a sense that
it’s a safe, friendly environment and you can tell the teachers just love what
they do.
Risk Item
The following is the risk question all participants were presented with.
Please indicate which option you prefer among the following gambles:
• 100% chance of earning $30
• 50% chance of earning $24 and 50% chance of earning $40
• 50% chance of earning $18 and 50% chance of earning $50
• 50% chance of earning $12 and 50% chance of earning $60
• 50% chance of earning $6 and 50% chance of earning $70
• 50% chance of earning $6 and 50% chance of earning $70
• 50% chance of earning $0 and 50% chance of earning $80
Effort Task
The following is a screenshot of the coding speed that constituted the real effort task.
Questionnaire
The following is a screenshot of the questionnaire.
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Figure 5: Coding Speet Test
C Payment Mechanism
Participants were informed only one in ten would be paid on the basis of their responses
in the email inviting them to sessions for the experiment, in the Participant Information
Statement provided with the email and also prior to beginning the experiment when they
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Figure 6: Questionnaire
arrived at the laboratory.
The mechanism for determining who was paid was described as follows:
One in ten participants will be randomly chosen to receive payment. In Week
2 you will be sent an email indicating the winning number which is the unit
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value of the S&P/ASX 200 at its close on Tuesday 2nd August. If the unit
value of your Individual ID (as indicated on the card you received at the start
of the experiment) matches this number you will be paid for your responses in
the experiment.
For example:
You have Group ID number 3 and Individual ID number 38. On Tuesday 2nd
August the closing value of the S&P/ASX 200 is 4468.1. The winning number
is therefore 8. As your Individual ID ends in 8 you will be paid based on your
responses.
The email in week 2 will include details of how to collect payment. You will
need to bring your card with you when collecting payment so please
retain your card.
D Additional Results
Description of Variables
Aspiration Ratio Ratio of minimum in-
come for reasonable standard of living
to average salary estimate
Low Treatment group dummy variable
High Treatment group dummy variable
Delayed Treatment group dummy vari-
able
Immediate Treatment group dummy vari-
able
InteractionLD Treatment group dummy
variable
InteractionHD Treatment group dummy
variable
Satisfaction Ascending indicator of life
satisfaction from 1 - 10
Father Edu five point parental education
scale, 1 - no secondary, 2 - completed
secondary, 3 - diploma, 4 - undergrad-
uate, 5 - postgraduate
Mother Edu five point parental educa-
tion scale, 1 - no secondary, 2 - com-
pleted secondary, 3 - diploma, 4 - un-
dergraduate, 5 - postgraduate
Study... Field of study dummy variables,
Economics/econometrics comparison
category
Year of Study Indicator from 1 - 4 with 4
representing 4th year or above
Initial Mood Ascending mood indicator
from 1 - 7 measured at start of exper-
iment
Final Mood Ascending mood indicator
from 1 - 7 measured at end of experi-
ment
outlier Dummy variable indicating
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whether observation identified as out-
lier
Risk Indicator of risk choice from 0 (cer-
tain outcome) to 5 (most risky option)
Real Effort Score obtained on effort task
(possible score from 0 - 30)
Male Dummy Gender dummy variable,
female comparison category
International Student Domestic/international
student dummy variable, domestic
comparison category
Parent Lang... Parent language dummy
variables, English comparison cate-
gory
Born... Region of birth dummy variables,
Aus/NZ comparison category
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Tables and Figures
Table 9: Summary Statistics without Outliers
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HighImmediate
Aspirational Income 51 67088.24 20315.93 30000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 51 52362.75 13831.51 20000 95000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 51 1.305689 .3065522 .7142857 2.111111
LowImmediate
Aspirational Income 50 52320 15602.77 25000 100000
Average Salary Estimate 50 55100 16667.52 24000 110000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 50 .9794683 .2400336 .4285714 1.538462
HighDelayed
Aspirational Income 44 68227.27 27358.82 10000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 44 49409.09 11422.78 2500 80000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 44 1.416446 .5786999 .1818182 3
LowDelayed
Aspirational Income 44 59750 30818.39 4000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 44 44522.73 15692.52 4000 80000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 44 1.353786 .5236756 .3 2.857143
Table 10: Effect of Priming on Aspirational to Average Income Ratio
Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low -0.33*** -0.39*** -0.38***
(0.05) (0.12) (0.11)
Delayed 0.82** 0.32 0.24
(0.39) (0.22) (0.20)
InteractionLD -0.45 -0.13 -0.05
(0.40) (0.39) (0.36)
High 0.78** 0.53 0.43
(0.40) (0.35) (0.31)
Immediate -0.36*** -0.18 -0.19
(0.08) (0.20) (0.19)
InteractionHI -0.45 -0.13 -0.05
(0.40) (0.39) (0.36)
Satisfaction 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Father Edu 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Mother Edu -0.13 -0.11 -0.13 -0.11
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Study Accounting 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.45
(0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30)
Study Finance -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02
(0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18)
Study other business 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.20
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
Study other -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Year of Study 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Final Mood -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
outlier 5.41** 5.47*** 5.41** 5.47***
(2.17) (2.10) (2.17) (2.10)
Initial Mood 0.02 0.02
(0.11) (0.11)
Risk 0.06 0.06
(0.06) (0.06)
Real Effort -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Male Dummy -0.17 -0.17
(0.15) (0.15)
International Student -0.17 -0.17
(0.14) (0.14)
Parent Lang Chinese 0.01 0.01
(0.29) (0.29)
Parent Lang Other 0.04 0.04
(0.20) (0.20)
Born East Asia 0.09 0.09
(0.32) (0.32)
Born Asia Sub cont 0.02 0.02
(0.20) (0.20)
Born Other 0.28 0.28
(0.20) (0.20)
cons 1.31*** 2.23** 1.87** 1.34*** 2.02* 1.68**
(0.04) (0.98) (0.79) (0.08) (1.03) (0.83)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
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Table 11: Relative Effect of Priming on Aspirational Income Ratio
Log of Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low -0.29*** -0.32*** -0.31***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Delayed 0.10 0.06 0.03
(0.14) (0.11) (0.10)
InteractionLD 0.17 0.19 0.21
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
High 0.12 0.13 0.10
(0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
Immediate -0.27*** -0.25*** -0.24***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
InteractionHI 0.17 0.19 0.21
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Satisfaction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Father Edu 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother Edu -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Study Accounting 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Study Finance -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Study other business 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.18
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Study other -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Year of Study -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Final Mood -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
outlier 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.60
(0.90) 0.91 (0.90) 0.91
Initial Mood 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.05)
Risk 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Real Effort -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Male Dummy -0.16** -0.16**
(0.08 (0.08
International Student -0.08 -0.08
(0.12) (0.12)
Parent Lang Chinese 0.07 0.07
(0.14) (0.14)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Log of Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parent Lang Other 0.02 0.02
(0.10) (0.10)
Born East Asia -0.11 -0.11
(0.18) (0.18)
Born Asia Sub cont -0.01 -0.01
(0.12) (0.12)
Born Other 0.17 0.17
(0.13) (0.13)
cons 0.24*** 1.20* 0.62 0.22*** 1.14* 0.54
(0.03) (0.63) (0.43) (0.06) (0.64) (0.43)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
Figure 7: Aspirational against Average Income without outliers
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Table 12: Ordered Probit Estimate of Influences on Risk
Regression Series
Risk (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low -0.04 0.1 -0.06
(0.20) (0.22) (0.22)
Delayed -0.19 -0.32 -0.17
(0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
InteractionLD 0.38 0.49 0.40
(0.31) (0.33) (0.32)
High -0.34 -0.59** -0.46*
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25)
Immediate -0.19 -0.16 -0.23
(0.22) (0.24) (0.23)
InteractionHI 0.38 0.49 0.40
(0.31) (0.33) (0.32)
Aspiration Ratio 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Satisfaction -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Father Edu -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Mother Edu 0.19** 0.17* 0.19** 0.17*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Study Accounting -0.35 -0.30 -0.35 -0.30
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Study Finance 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29
(0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30)
Study other business -0.40 -0.42 -0.40 -0.42
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35)
Study other -0.30 -0.31 -0.30 -0.31
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Year of Study -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Final Mood 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
outlier -0.20 -0.25 -0.20 -0.25
(0.32) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34)
Initial Mood -0.10 -0.10
(0.12) (0.12)
Real Effort 0.04* 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02)
Male Dummy 0.32* 0.32*
(0.17) (0.17)
International Student 0.19 0.19
(0.24) (0.24)
Parent Lang Chinese 0.09 0.09
(0.24) (0.24)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Regression Series
Risk (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parent Lang Other -0.15 -0.15
(0.28) (0.28)
Born East Asia -0.19 -0.19
(0.30) (0.30)
Born Asia Sub cont 0.19 0.19
(0.31) (0.31)
Born Other -0.09 -0.09
(0.39) (0.39)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
Figure 8: Risk Histograms
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Table 13: Tobit Estimate of Influences on Real Effort
Regression Series
Real Effort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low 0.02 -0.63 -0.30
(1.40) (1.41) (1.39)
Delayed -0.67 0.50 0.43
(1.42) (1.42) (1.46)
InteractionLD 1.49 -0.13 0.23
(2.07) (2.08) (2.09)
High -1.51 0.76 0.07
(1.52) (1.53) (1.56)
Immediate -0.82 -0.37 -0.66
(1.50) (1.48) (1.43)
InteractionHI 1.49 -0.13 0.23
(2.07) (2.08) (2.09)
Aspiration Ratio -0.67 -0.56 -0.67 -0.56
(0.43) (0.47) (0.43) (0.47)
Satisfaction 0.59 0.55 0.59 0.55
(0.38) (0.47) (0.38) (0.47)
Father Edu 0.39 0.28 0.39 0.28
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45)
Mother Edu -0.81 -0.68 -0.81 -0.68
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Study Accounting -1.08 -0.82 -1.08 -0.82
(2.00) (1.95) (2.00) (1.95)
Study Finance -2.78 -2.00 -2.78 -2.00
(1.88) (1.89) (1.88) (1.89)
Study other business 1.30 0.88 1.30 0.88
(2.39) (2.41) (2.39) (2.41)
Study other 0.20 -0.21 0.20 -0.21
(1.58) (1.61) (1.58) (1.61)
Year of Study 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.21
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
Final Mood 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.65
(0.76) (0.58) (0.76) (0.58)
outlier 1.42 0.55 1.42 0.55
(3.88) (4.15) (3.88) (4.15)
International Student -4.20*** -3.03*** -4.20*** -3.03***
(1.31) (1.10) (1.31) (1.10)
Initial Mood -0.01 -0.01
(0.78) (0.78)
Risk 0.69** 0.69**
(0.31) (0.31)
Male Dummy -0.38 -0.38
(1.06) (1.06)
Parent Lang Chinese 0.91 0.91
(1.55) (1.55)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Regression Series
Real Effort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parent Lang Other -1.01 -1.01
(1.71) (1.71)
Born East Asia 1.28 1.28
(1.68) (1.68)
Born Asia Sub cont 1.89 1.89
(1.93) (1.93)
Born Other 1.55 1.55
(1.98) (1.98)
cons 30.07*** 24.01*** 25.67*** 30.91*** 23.8*** 26.04***
(1.04) (4.52) (3.89) (1.17) (4.55) (3.94)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
Table 14: Ordered Probit Estimate of Influences on Satisfaction
Regression Series
Satisfaction (1) (2)
Aspiration Ratio 0.05 0.06
(0.07) (0.06)
Father Edu 0.06 0.07
(0.07) (0.07)
Mother Edu 0.04 0.04
(0.08) (0.08)
Study Accounting 0.02 -0.12
(0.35) (0.31)
Study Finance 0.28 0.32
(0.33) (0.31)
Study other business -0.12 -0.03
(0.41) (0.33)
Study other -0.12 0.03
(0.41) (0.27)
Year of Study -0.01 -0.01
(0.09) (0.08)
Final Mood 0.28** 0.72***
(0.13) (0.10)
outlier -0.27 -0.20
(0.42) (0.45)
International Student 0.21
-0.26
Initial Mood 0.62***
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Regression Series
Satisfaction (1) (2)
(0.13)
Risk -0.02
(0.05)
Male Dummy -0.14
(0.15)
Parent Lang Chinese -0.20
(0.21)
Parent Lang Other -0.17
(0.30)
Born East Asia -0.09
(0.29)
Born Asia Sub cont 0.01
(0.38)
Born Other 0.30
(0.36)
Notes:
Ordered probit estimation implemented.
Treatment dummies not included as satisfaction measured prior to priming.
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
Table 15: Ordered Probit Estimate of Influences on Moodchange
Regression Series
Change in Mood (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low -0.05 -0.02 -0.05
(0.23) (0.27) (0.26)
Delayed -0.15 -0.05 -0.04
(0.21) (0.26) (0.24)
InteractionLD 0.27 0.21 0.22
(0.32) (0.36) (0.35)
High -0.22 -0.19 -0.17
(0.22) (0.26) (0.25)
Immediate -0.12 -0.16 -0.17
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
InteractionHI 0.27 0.21 0.22
(0.32) (0.36) (0.35)
Aspiration Ratio -0.12** -0.13** -0.12** -0.13**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Satisfaction 0.15* 0.14* 0.15* 0.14*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Father Edu 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Mother Edu -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Regression Series
Change in Mood (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Study Accounting 0.15* 0.03 0.15* 0.03
(0.33) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31)
Study Finance -0.19 -0.31 -0.19 -0.31
(0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30)
Study other business -0.17 -0.21 -0.17 -0.21
(0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38)
Study other -0.19 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18
(0.27) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24)
Year of Study 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
outlier 0.85** 0.76** 0.85** 0.76**
(0.37) (0.33) (0.37) (0.33)
Initial Mood -0.68*** -0.66*** -0.68*** -0.66***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Risk -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Real Effort 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Male Dummy 0.13 0.13
(0.18) (0.18)
International Student -0.30 -0.30
(0.25) (0.25)
Parent Lang Chinese 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17
(0.24) (0.19) (0.24) (0.19)
Parent Lang Other 0.60** 0.55** 0.60** 0.55**
(0.29) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26)
Born East Asia 0.11 0.11
(0.31) (0.31)
Born Asia Sub cont 0.17 0.17
(0.34) (0.34)
Born Other -0.02 -0.02
(0.34) (0.34)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
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E Robustness Test Results
Table 16: Summary With Alternate Inclusion Rule and Without Outliers
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HighImmediate
Aspirational Income 46 67641.3 20555.25 30000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 46 52836.96 13190.93 30000 95000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 46 1.299654 .3125227 .7142857 2.111111
LowImmediate
Aspirational Income 50 53220 15586.87 25000 100000
Average Salary Estimate 50 54700 16542.15 24000 110000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 50 1.000897 .2376628 .5 1.538462
HighDelayed
Aspirational Income 40 68050 28180.69 10000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 40 49175 10805.71 25000 80000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 40 1.415729 .5976884 .1818182 3
LowDelayed
Aspirational Income 45 62222.22 30454.8 15000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 45 44777.78 15162.59 10000 80000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 45 1.483561 .8639004 .3 6
Table 17: Excerpt of Estimate with Squared Control Terms
Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
Low -0.33*** High 0.49
(0.12) (0.33)
Delayed 0.37 Immediate -0.21
(0.23) (0.19)
InteractionLD -0.16 InteractionHI -0.16
(0.38) (0.38)
Father Edu -0.06* Father Edu -0.06*
(0.37) (0.37)
Father Edu2 0.11* Father Edu2 0.11*
(0.06) (0.06)
Mother Edu 0.71* Mother Edu 0.71*
(0.41) (0.41)
Mother Edu2 -0.14* Mother Edu2 -0.14*
(0.08) (0.08)
Risk -0.17 Risk -0.17
(0.11) (0.11)
Risk2 0.04 Risk2 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Real Effort 0.50* Real Effort 0.50*
Continued on Next Page. . .
69
E ROBUSTNESS TEST RESULTS
Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
(0.27) (0.27)
Real Effort2 -0.01* Real Effort2 -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01)
outlier 5.46*** outlier 5.46***
(2.01) (2.01)
Estimate includes all control variables. Only relevant measures reported.
Table 20: VIF of Aspirational Income Es-
timate
VIF
Born E Asia 3.22
InteractionLD 3.18
Initial Mood 3.15
Study other 2.59
Final Mood 2.58
International 2.36
Delayed 2.28
PL Chinese 2.28
Born Asia SC 2.26
Accounting 2.23
Low 2.15
Satisfaction 2.04
Finance 1.91
Born Other 1.86
Other business 1.64
PL other 1.59
Mother Edu 1.59
Father Edu 1.45
Real Effort 1.18
Male 1.15
Yr of Study 1.15
outlier 1.14
Risk 1.13
Mean VIF 2.00
High Immediate is comparison
treatment in this estimate
Table 21: VIF of Aspirational Income Es-
timate (continued)
VIF
InteractionHI 3.58
Born E Asia 3.22
Initial Mood 3.15
Study other 2.59
Final Mood 2.58
High 2.53
International 2.36
Immediate 2.30
PL Chinese 2.28
Born Asia SC 2.26
Accounting 2.23
Satisfaction 2.04
Finance 1.91
Born Other 1.86
Other business 1.64
PL other 1.59
Mother Edu 1.59
Father Edu 1.45
Real Effort 1.18
Male 1.15
Yr of Study 1.15
outlier 1.14
Risk 1.13
Mean VIF 2.04
Low Delayed is comparison treat-
ment in this estimate
70
E ROBUSTNESS TEST RESULTS
T
ab
le
18
:
P
ai
rw
is
e
C
or
re
la
ti
on
of
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
H
ig
h
Im
m
ed
ia
te
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
H
I
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
In
it
ia
l
M
o
o
d
R
is
k
R
ea
l
E
ff
or
t
M
al
e
F
at
h
er
E
d
u
H
ig
h
1.
00
00
Im
m
ed
ia
te
-0
.0
16
3
1.
00
00
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
H
I
0.
58
01
*
0.
57
41
*
1.
00
00
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
-0
.0
38
4
-0
.1
10
5
-0
.0
53
6
1.
00
00
In
it
ia
l
M
o
o
d
-0
.0
13
7
-0
.0
82
1
-0
.0
54
0.
68
27
*
1.
00
00
R
is
k
-0
.0
65
6
-0
.0
14
7
-0
.0
04
1
-0
.0
65
2
-0
.0
75
1
1.
00
00
R
ea
l
E
ff
or
t
-0
.0
47
6
0.
00
97
0.
00
01
0.
16
24
*
0.
16
79
*
0.
09
86
1.
00
00
M
al
e
0.
10
97
-0
.1
87
9*
-0
.0
42
1
-0
.0
19
8
0.
01
91
0.
09
86
-0
.0
48
1
1.
00
00
F
at
h
er
E
d
u
0.
01
04
0.
06
30
0.
10
36
0.
10
57
0.
08
83
-0
.0
29
9
-0
.0
18
5
0.
02
13
1.
00
00
M
ot
h
er
E
d
u
0.
13
98
-0
.0
01
7
0.
14
27
*
0.
02
74
0.
01
56
0.
05
16
-0
.0
38
2
0.
01
66
0.
48
96
*
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
0.
03
92
-0
.0
73
2
-0
.0
35
1
0.
11
45
0.
09
34
0.
01
18
-0
.2
07
9*
0.
03
86
0.
01
15
Y
r
of
S
tu
d
y
-0
.0
64
1
0.
03
05
0.
05
01
-0
.0
25
9
-0
.0
47
3
0.
00
56
0.
00
87
-0
.1
12
8
-0
.1
00
5
F
in
al
M
o
o
d
-0
.0
42
3
-0
.0
84
5
-0
.0
49
9
0.
58
16
*
0.
76
65
*
-0
.0
60
7
0.
18
87
*
0.
03
63
0.
10
49
ou
tl
ie
r
0.
11
43
-0
.1
84
7*
-0
.1
06
0.
00
64
0.
04
36
-0
.0
34
1
-0
.0
93
5
0.
01
19
0.
01
08
P
L
C
h
in
es
e
-0
.0
43
0
-0
.0
93
4
-0
.0
93
5
0.
01
88
0.
06
37
0.
01
58
0.
00
79
-0
.1
07
9
-0
.0
65
1
P
L
ot
h
er
0.
04
59
0.
07
00
0.
13
43
-0
.0
19
5
-0
.0
23
6
-0
.0
55
7
-0
.0
38
3
0.
05
70
0.
06
70
B
or
n
E
A
si
a
-0
.0
61
8
0.
01
68
-0
.0
19
2
-0
.0
72
6
-0
.0
76
1
-0
.0
16
0
-0
.0
88
6
0.
02
73
-0
.0
01
2
B
or
n
A
si
a
S
C
0.
16
50
*
-0
.0
44
0.
02
25
0.
09
56
0.
11
77
0.
02
81
-0
.0
04
2
-0
.0
89
9
0.
02
49
B
or
n
O
th
er
-0
.0
41
6
-0
.0
12
8
0.
04
60
0.
10
24
0.
04
83
-0
.0
19
1
-0
.0
10
9
-0
.0
08
7
0.
03
50
A
cc
ou
n
ti
n
g
-0
.0
96
2
-0
.0
72
2
-0
.1
24
4
-0
.0
19
5
-0
.0
62
-0
.0
29
9
-0
.1
15
6
-0
.0
28
5
0.
02
59
F
in
an
ce
0.
07
73
0.
04
38
0.
05
58
0.
07
76
0.
02
56
0.
16
13
*
-0
.0
95
6
0.
02
74
-0
.0
47
4
O
th
er
b
u
si
n
es
s
0.
04
66
-0
.0
65
7
0.
06
43
-0
.0
16
7
0.
00
47
-0
.0
20
5
0.
00
33
-0
.0
34
0
0.
07
11
S
tu
d
y
ot
h
er
-0
.0
85
9
-0
.0
13
4
-0
.0
94
9
-0
.0
47
7
-0
.0
03
-0
.1
06
1
0.
12
11
0.
00
14
-0
.0
60
8
N
ot
e:
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
5%
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
le
ve
l
71
E ROBUSTNESS TEST RESULTS
T
ab
le
19
:
P
ai
rw
is
e
C
or
re
la
ti
on
of
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
M
ot
h
er
E
d
u
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
Y
r
of
S
tu
d
y
F
in
al
M
o
o
d
ou
tl
ie
r
P
L
C
h
in
es
e
P
L
ot
h
er
B
or
n
E
A
si
a
M
ot
h
er
E
d
u
1.
00
00
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
-0
.0
82
1.
00
00
Y
r
of
S
tu
d
y
-0
.0
71
5
0.
06
79
1.
00
00
F
in
al
M
o
o
d
0.
01
16
0.
05
33
-0
.0
15
6
1.
00
00
ou
tl
ie
r
-0
.0
58
4
0.
08
10
0.
03
71
0.
02
64
1.
00
00
P
L
C
h
in
es
e
-0
.1
87
7*
0.
29
10
*
-0
.0
75
7
0.
05
03
0.
02
49
1.
00
00
P
L
ot
h
er
0.
05
75
0.
07
93
0.
02
85
0.
07
65
-0
.0
76
-0
.3
70
9*
1.
00
00
B
or
n
E
A
si
a
-0
.0
78
8
0.
41
20
*
0.
04
34
-0
.0
44
4
0.
05
66
0.
49
35
*
-0
.1
33
1
1.
00
00
B
or
n
A
si
a
S
C
0.
02
10
0.
25
48
*
0.
02
35
0.
11
59
-0
.0
73
0.
08
68
0.
19
02
*
-0
.2
99
6*
B
or
n
O
th
er
-0
.0
33
4
0.
17
29
*
0.
14
81
*
0.
03
74
0.
03
03
-0
.2
77
5*
0.
29
72
*
-0
.2
60
9*
A
cc
ou
n
ti
n
g
0.
04
13
0.
30
83
*
-0
.0
77
6
0.
00
93
0.
08
86
0.
31
79
*
-0
.0
24
2
0.
25
47
*
F
in
an
ce
-0
.2
05
5*
0.
19
59
*
0.
02
35
-0
.0
08
6
0.
01
17
0.
14
58
*
-0
.0
93
5
0.
13
00
O
th
er
b
u
si
n
es
s
0.
07
79
0.
05
50
0.
07
91
0.
00
27
0.
05
02
-0
.0
11
9
0.
17
05
*
-0
.0
35
4
S
tu
d
y
ot
h
er
0.
12
24
-0
.3
42
9*
-0
.0
88
6
-0
.0
44
8
-0
.0
49
4
-0
.3
03
5*
-0
.0
32
9
-0
.2
60
4*
B
or
n
A
si
a
S
C
B
or
n
O
th
er
A
cc
ou
n
ti
n
g
F
in
an
ce
O
th
er
b
u
si
n
es
s
S
tu
d
y
ot
h
er
B
or
n
A
si
a
S
C
1.
00
00
B
or
n
O
th
er
-0
.1
46
0*
1.
00
00
A
cc
ou
n
ti
n
g
0.
10
91
-0
.1
07
1
1.
00
00
F
in
an
ce
0.
04
08
0.
03
89
-0
.1
74
6*
1.
00
00
O
th
er
b
u
si
n
es
s
-0
.0
22
9
0.
11
96
-0
.1
31
8
-0
.1
26
5
1.
00
00
S
tu
d
y
ot
h
er
-0
.1
23
3
0.
05
26
-0
.4
03
0*
-0
.3
87
0*
-0
.2
92
1*
1.
00
00
72
E ROBUSTNESS TEST RESULTS
Table 22: Effect of Priming on Domestic Students Only
Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low -0.36*** -0.25* -0.26**
(0.07) (0.13) (0.12)
Delayed 0.33 0.34 0.32
(0.30) (0.23) (0.23)
InteractionLD 0.05 -0.12 -0.18
(0.31) (0.31) (0.34)
High 0.30 0.37 0.44
(0.30) (0.26) (0.28)
Immediate -0.38*** -0.22 -0.14
(0.09) (0.16) (0.16)
InteractionHI 0.05 -0.12 -0.18
(0.31) (0.31) (0.34)
Satisfaction -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Father Edu 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Mother Edu 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Study Accounting 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.10
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Study Finance 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30)
Study other business 0.58* 0.54 0.58* 0.54
(0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34)
Study other -0.16 -0.05 -0.16 -0.05
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Year of Study 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Final Mood -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
outlier 2.37 2.67 2.37 2.67
(1.77) (1.96) (1.77) (1.96)
Initial Mood 0.09 0.09
(0.11) (0.11)
Risk -0.05 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Real Effort -0.05* -0.05*
(0.02) (0.02)
Male Dummy -0.16 -0.16
(0.11) (0.11)
Parent Lang Chinese -0.22 -0.22
(0.20) (0.20)
Parent Lang Other -0.05 -0.05
(0.19) (0.19)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Born East Asia 0.18 0.18
(0.19) (0.19)
Born Asia Sub cont 0.08 0.08
(0.26) (0.26)
Born Other 0.57 0.57
(0.33) (0.33)
cons 1.34*** 2.42*** 1.22*** 1.37*** 2.39*** 1.10**
(0.06) (0.68) (0.46) (0.08) (0.66) (0.45)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
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F Influences on Susceptibility Results
Table 23: Susceptibility of Priming with Risk
Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
Low -0.28* High 0.56
(0.15) (0.48)
Delayed 0.15 Immediate 0.14
(0.33) (0.29)
Risk 0.02 Risk 0.11
(0.04) (0.08)
InteractionLD -0.29 InteractionHI -0.29
(0.50) (0.50)
Low*risk -0.06 High*risk -0.03
(0.07) (0.18)
Delayed*risk 0.06 Immed*risk -0.15*
(0.16) (0.09)
Low*Delay*risk 0.09 High*Imm*risk 0.09
(0.17) (0.17)
High Immediate and Female comparison treatment in left panel
Low Delayed and Female comparison treatment in right panel
Estimate includes all control variables. Only relevant measures reported.
Table 24: Susceptibility of Priming with Gender
Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
Low -0.43*** High 0.72
(0.14) (0.55)
Delayed 0.40 Immediate -0.12
(0.38) (0.31)
Male -0.21* Male 0.06
(0.12) (0.30)
InteractionLD -0.29 InteractionHI -0.29
(0.58) (0.58)
Low*male 0.12 High*male -0.43
(0.18) (0.61)
Delayed*male -0.16 Immed*male -0.15
(0.53) (0.30)
Low*Delay*male 0.31 High*Imm*male 0.31
(0.63) (0.63)
High Immediate and Female comparison treatment in left panel
Low Delayed and Female comparison treatment in right panel
Estimate includes all control variables. Only relevant measures reported.
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Table 25: Susceptibility of Priming with Father Education
Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
Low 0.07 High 1.83
(0.29) (1.22)
Delayed 1.03 Immediate 0.88
(0.92) (0.79)
InteractionLD -1.91 InteractionHI -1.91
(1.31) (1.31)
Low*FatherEdu -0.13* High*FatherEdu -0.41
(0.08) (0.32)
Delayed*FatherEdu -0.24 Immed*FatherE -0.30
(0.28) (0.18)
Low*Delay*FEdu 0.54 High*Imm*FEdu 0.54
(0.34) (0.34)
High Immediate and Female comparison treatment in left panel
Low Delayed and Female comparison treatment in right panel
Estimate includes all control variables. Only relevant measures reported.
Table 26: Susceptibility of Priming with Mother Education
Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
Low -0.21 High 3.04**
(0.27) (1.21)
Delayed 1.89** Immediate 0.94
(0.87) (0.77)
InteractionLD -2.83** InteractionHI -2.83**
(1.20) (1.20)
Low*MotherEdu -0.05 High*MotherEdu -0.81**
(0.08) (0.32)
Delayed*MotherEdu -0.52* Immed*MotherE -0.34*
(0.27) (0.20)
Low*Delay*MEdu 0.86*** High*Imm*MEdu 0.86***
(0.33) (0.33)
High Immediate and Female comparison treatment in left panel
Low Delayed and Female comparison treatment in right panel
Estimate includes all control variables. Only relevant measures reported.
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Table 27: Susceptibility of Priming with Satisfaction
Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
Low -0.69 High 1.63
(0.47) (1.04)
Delayed 1.06 Immediate -0.11
(0.95) (0.44)
Satisfaction 0.05 Satisfaction 0.10*
(0.06) (0.06)
InteractionLD -0.95 InteractionHI -0.95
(1.03) (1.03)
Low*Satisfaction 0.04 High*Satisfaction -0.16
(0.06) (0.14)
Delayed*Satisfaction -0.11 Immed*Satisfaction -0.01
(0.95) (0.06)
Low*Delay*Sat 0.11 High*Imm*Sat 0.11
(0.14) (0.14)
High Immediate and Satisfaction=2 control treatment in left panel
Low Delayed and Satisfaction=2 control treatment in right panel
Estimate includes all control variables. Only relevant measures reported.
Table 28: Susceptibility of Priming with East - West Cost Difference
Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
Low -0.41* High 0.71
(0.25) (1.10)
Delayed -0.19 Immediate 0.50
(0.60) (0.73)
East West Diff 0.03 East West Diff 0.38
(0.09) (0.30)
InteractionLD -0.31 InteractionHI -0.31
(1.14) (1.14)
InteractionLowEW -0.01 InteractionHighEW -0.13
(0.11) (0.44)
InteractionDelayedEW 0.23 InteractionImmEW -0.36
(0.24) (0.30)
InteractionLowDelEW 0.13 InteractionHighDelEW 0.13
(0.44) (0.44)
High Immediate and E - W Difference = 1 control treatment in left panel
Low Delayed and E - W Difference = 1 control treatment in right panel
Estimate includes all control variables. Only relevant measures reported.
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